Thursday, April 24, 2014

Udall Being Propped Up Completely By The Under 30s

This morning, Quinnipiac releases the second half of their writeup on their recent polling of Colorado. Topline numbers for the Senate race: Udall 45, Gardner 44.

The numbers are even worse than that suggests for Udall.

  • His lead is entirely due to those under the age of 30. He captures that cohort by 31 points!
  • That age cohort, though, really knows absolutely nothing about Gardner. 72% of then haven't heard enough about him to form an opinion. Only 12% view him unfavorably.
  • Udall trails among every other age cohort, with his biggest deficit coming among seniors (who happen to be the most reliable in terms of turning out). Gardner takes them by 8 points.
  • Udall's approval rating among age cohorts: 39% for those between 30-49 as well as those 65+. On the 50-64%, it's 42%. The under 29s? 50%.
  • On question after question, that age cohort has very high "DK/NA" or "Haven't heard enough" responses; this is a sign of a lack of engagement which to me further suggests potentially weak turnout. Naturally, that is "if the election happened today."
  • In the Presidential horserace questions, Clinton loses to Paul by 5 points, with the under 30s splitting evenly at 43%. I read this in conjunction with what I mention above to mean that the under 30s are not opposed to a Republican. They just don't want what I will call "the same old Republicans." Jeb Bush is the only GOP name tested in this survey with more than 25% unfavorable responses from the under 30s.

Those are some really ugly numbers there, and it may be time to start moving Colorado up on the list in terms of seats most likely to flip. Barring some significant improvement by Udall with those 30 and over (if these crosstabs truly capture the Colorado landscape), he is going to lose.

Other quick notes... The number one issue cited by respondents was Healthcare. Udall trails by 21 points among those citing that issue as their main one. Second is the economy. Udall trails by 13 points among those... Christie (tied) and Huckabee (down 1) are competitive versus Clinton, whereas old guard Jeb Bush loses by 5.

Wednesday, April 23, 2014

Structural Aspects of Mail-in (and Early) Voting for GOTV Efforts

The above is in reference to Oregon.

I have a theory. Let's leave aside the who (be it SIEU, or whoever) is involved in any structural advantage. The fruits of GOTV efforts result, in part, from the man-hours expended. There are a limited number of bodies available to throw at the task, so to increase the man-hours you extend the voting time window. The party that gets the most benefit from GOTV efforts therefore benefits more from extended windows.

Tied in with this, I believe GOTV efforts generally are more favorable to Democrats, due to the fact that urban areas, with their higher population densities, tend to favor them. Higher population densities mean less ground to cover for ground-level GOTV efforts, which makes them more efficient in those areas.

Thursday, April 17, 2014

The Cynical Exaggerating to the Point of Blatently Lying Preceded Obama

Ace wrote:

Like the typical sort of blog-trolling, Obama is basically writing grabby, preposterous, eye-catching, false headlines. And as with the various outfits which practice trolling all day long, he doesn't expect to catch flack for his mangling of the facts for viral hits, because no one expects a Salon headline to be honest in the first place, and, increasingly, few expect honesty from a President, either.

As always, go and read the whole thing. However, while the linked article (and supporting articles by John Dickerson and Major Garrett suggest that this is basically a new tactic the President has brought to the national table, I believe that it is just the natural evolution from one embraced by former President Clinton:

They thought the election was over, the Republicans did. By the time it was over, our candidate had won the popular vote, and the only way they could win the election was to stop the voting in Florida. He did a great job.

Stop the voting?

How about stopping the selective recounting with shifting criteria? No, saying "stop the voting" was a cynical and deliberate misrepresentation, designed to delight his side and infuriate the other side.

Wednesday, April 16, 2014

You know what would be fun?

If Charles Koch decided to make enough of a run for President that his views actually are made known.

David would work equally well in this regard.

Wednesday, April 9, 2014

Colorado vs New Hampshire

Is Colorado fundamentally more blue than NH?

Entity Colorado NH
Governor D D
Lt. Governor D N/A
Secretary of State R D
Treasurer R D
Attorney General R D
Executive Council N/A D
US Senate (1) D D
US Senate (2) D R
US House R+1 D+2
State House D+9 D+42
State Sen D+1** R+2

** Democratic control saved by Evie Hudak resigning rather than facing recall, allowing Democrats to appoint a replacement.

NH went for Kerry in 2004 while CO went for Bush. Granted, Kerry was from nearby MA.

All in all, the GOP has had a rough time in both states since the start of the 2000s, but to my eyes NH has been behaving more like a blue state of late than Colorado has.

MI, on the other hand, has been as blue or bluer than either for quite a while.

Wednesday, March 12, 2014

On The Hickman Analytics Survey of Arkansas Why I Misread It

Just a few days ago, a poll of Arkansas by Hickman Analytics was published that had some interesting aspects to it.

Let me start off by confessing that some of my tweets the morning this hit the wire featured me misinterpreting what their pdf was presenting.

They went about asking some questions regarding the Senate race between Pryor and Cotton. But before they presented those results, they showed that their sample was comprised completely of people who said either that they would definitely vote in this election, or that they would probably vote in it. Intriguingly, they presented some of the results with the definite voters as their own breakout.

For example, when they asked the two-man horserace question (meaning, offering just Pryor and just Cotton; hereafter referred to Q5 as in the pdf), they found that definite voters chose Cotton by 9 points, 51-42%. However, they said likely voters were split evenly between the two candidates.

This is where my confusion started. Earlier in the pdf, they showed that their sample was comprised of 77% definite voters, and 23% probable. Obviously, the definite voters in the breakout on Q5 are those definite voters. But when they said likely voters, did they mean "all of the probables plus all of the definites", or did they mean "just the probables."?

The lack of an overall topline result on top of those two breakouts for the question suggests that the answer is "all of the probables plus all of the definites." In retrospect, more than suggests. But that is not how I took it. I immediately read it as that they simply used the words probable and likely interchangeably. (Spoiler alert: I was wrong)

Let me explain why I jumped to that conclusion, because I think it still speaks to some oddness in the data. To do so, let's revisit Q5, which showed Cotton leading 51-42% among definite voters and them tied at 46% among likely voters.

Since the definite voters comprise more than three quarters of the total sample, for the likely voter breakout to be inclusive of the definite voters, then the "likely but not definite" voters would need to be somewhere along the lines of 59% for Pryor, 29% for Cotton (Pryor +30!).

That is a fairly astounding gap, and feels like the kind of thing that would be noted in the writeup since it is such a surprising tidbit.

The math that led me to the 59-29% breakout assumes that the integers presented as the results by Hickman are precise. However, rounding can make a difference. But could rounding make the gap between the two candidates look less astounding among these probable-but-not-definite voters? The values that would most bring the gap between the candidates as low as it could go among this cohort but still round to the integers they presented would be 50.5% for Cotton among definites to 42.4% for Pryor, and among likelies 46.4% for Cotton and 45.5% for Pryor. With that as the assumption, the gap between the two among probable-but-not-definite voters drops, but still is huge, at Pryor +23.

I suppose it is possible that this cohort, while being not quite sure that they would actually vote, could yet be so overwhelmingly tilted toward Pryor as to bring the Q5 result to a tie overall. Stranger things have happened.

But there were other questions where they had results listed for both likely and definite voters. One put Pryor head-to-head against an unnamed Republican (Q3, asked before Cotton was mentioned). Here, they found the Republican was favored among definite voters 50-38%; this is quite similar to the Q5 definites totals of 51-42%. For this question, however, there was a much more modest swing when going from definites to likelies; 47-39%. Doing the same math as above, this suggests the probable-but-not-definite cohort would support Pryor 42-37% (Pryor +5 over an unnamed opponent).

I suppose it is also possible that this cohort, while being not quite sure that they would actually vote, would be modestly for Pryor (Pryor +5) against an unnamed Republican while being overwhelmingly for him when that Republican is named (Pryor +30 against Cotton). Perhaps Cotton is simply viewed by this cohort as being completely radioactive.

But I have not mentioned Q2. This question was all about name recognition and favorability. Here we find that just 28% of the sample has heard of Tom Cotton and has an unfavorable opinion of him. No signs of radioactivity there. And if one goes down to the bottom of the pdf, where the crosstabs live, one can see that Cotton's unfavorability must actually be lower among the probable-but-not-definites than it is with the definites; it is 31% for the definites but just 28% for the total.

That is why I interpreted the "Likely" breakouts in the pdf to be synonymous with "probably vote" and not being inclusive of the definite voters. I had not done the math, but just a quick look at the numbers told me about what I presented just now.

But when you get down to the bottom of the pdf to the crosstabs, then it is clear I did not read it right, nor had I read down to the crosstabs when I had tweeted that morning. That was sloppy on my part.

The weirdness in what it implies about the probable-but-not-definite voters remains, though. There are only 92 in this cohort according to the crosstabs, which works out to a MoE of around +/- 10% for it. Usually, though, if it was going to be towards one end or the other, the answers would be consistently towards one end or the other, whereas here it does not seem to be the case. Perhaps this cohort had an unusual number of number mashers, and the rotation of the choices causes their results to be inconsistent. Or, maybe they really just believe things in the percentages I worked out above. Either way, with that small of a subsample, it should not have shocked me that they did not break it out separately.

Either way, the results of this poll hardly seem good news for Pryor. His generic re-elect number puts him at 39% among likely voters, and he gets only 1 point more in a named horserace with all of the candidates. He gets up to 46% if respondents are limited to him and Cotton, but among the most definite to vote, he loses there by 9 points. All of this is true, with his main opponent having 33% of the respondents insufficiently familiar with him to offer an opinion on how much they like him. All of this true, with 85% effective recognition for him. All of this true, with him being the incumbent. All of this true, in a state where 61% of likely voters identify as conservative.

Friday, February 7, 2014

Regarding the GOP Data Warehousing Efforts

Sometimes, 140 characters just isn't enough for a reply.

A cliche I hear in NFL broadcasts is that if a team has two first-string quarterbacks, then they really have none. Leaving aside the obvious counter-example of Joe Montana and Steve Young, it has more than a small grain of truth. It's overly glib, but I couldn't help but think that if the GOP has had data warehouses that have come and gone, they've really not had a good data warehouse.

Building out a robust data warehouse and the data mining operation to go along with it is a huge task involving many IT disciplines. The schema must be architected. The ETL (extraction, transformation, and load) processes must be built to populate the warehouse with data in usable form. The tools which will be used for querying must be deployed. The database must be tuned-- repeatedly, and iteratively. This is not a one or two month process. If, truly, there have been warehouses that have come and gone, then the wheel has been re-created several times over at a tremendous dollar cost and an even bigger lost mining opportunity cost.

An operation that is starting warehousing over at some cycle will fall behind another that built a robust warehouse and adapted it over time to integrate new data sources (hence a likely explanation for why what worked before has not been working recently) or to take advantage of the latest advances. That they are bringing it in-house, to give some more permanency to the warehouse and make its development an ongoing, iterative processes, shows that they have realized this and are making the right moves to rectify.

This is heartening news, as this is not the kind of race where if one falls behind, catching up is impossible. At the same time, it is not going to happen over night. While we are building over again, they are already mining while looking for ways to further enhance theirs. At least now we'll be running the race, rather than perpetually going back to the starting line.

I remain astounded, though, that this inefficiency existed for as long as it did.